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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXVI FEBRUARY, 1941 NUMBER 2
THE APEX CASEt
JAMES M. LANDIS
An approach to recent developments in the application of the Sherman
Act to organized labor, particularly its application in the recent case of
Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader,' forces one to go back over those instances
where the activities of workmen have on occasion been found to be in vio-
lation of our antitrust laws. For the Apex case has been variously inter-
preted by current commentators, who rightly regard it as a milestone in the
development of the Sherman Act. But the directions carved upon that mile-
stone have been said by some to point forward and by others to point back-
ward,2 so that one seems lost in a maze of contradiction.
Directions of this character are, of course, meaningless without a point of
reference and that point can only be the road begun just fifty years ago
when on July 2, 1890, the Sherman Act received presidential approval. No
significant statute ever succeeds in being adopted without some encrustation
already having taken place upon the bare and meagre terms chosen to express
a legislative desire. If the legislative proceedings fail to attach those mean-
ingful glosses to the statute, the temper of the times may tend to make more
plain what the manner of the application of the statute should be to those
complex and unforeseen facts that it is certain to encounter as soon as it
meets the real world of strife and altercation.
Obviously, the Sherman Act, if it were applicable to labor unions, would
have embodied something of the national attitude that in 1890 characterized
the reaction of the American people to the problem posed by the growth of
organized labor. But unfortunately no such national attitude was in 1890
even at the beginning of a process of crystallization. In 1890 organized labor
as a national movment was in its swaddling clothes. The public on occasion
viewed it with a sympathetic eye as it became conscious of the labor move-
ment as a significant social force in alleviating some of the situations that
fA lecture delivered at the Cornell Law School under the Frank Irvine Lectureship of
the Phi Delta Phi Foundation, November 15, 1940. [Ed.]
1310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1940).2 Compare, e.g., the contradictory statements of Lee Pressman, General Counsel of the
C. I. 0., Frank Burch, Secretary of the Central Labor Union of Philadelphia, and Assistant
Attorney General Arnold in N. Y. Times, May 28, 1940, p. 21.3For an interesting analysis of the case, see Labor under the Apex Decision (1940) 8
INT. JuRID. ASS'N BULL. 125.
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cried out for remedy. On the other hand as dramatic tales of such excesses
as characterized the Molly Maguires were brought to the public's attention
by the Westbrook Peglers of that day, some doubts as to labor's place must
have tempered that sympathy. More speculative members of that public must
also have realized that the inevitable logic of the labor movement called for
labor to be increasingly restive with regard to the "No Trespassing" signs
with which the feudal industrial economy of 1890 encircled the domain of
industrial management and industrial relationships.
Such judicial and sporadic legislative treatment of the problem as charac-
terized the beginnings of the industrial era that preceded 1890 gives the same
confused picture. Judges and legislators veered, as the public did, between
sympathy and harshness. Liberal decisions such as that of Chief Justice Shaw
of Massachusetts in Cornmonwealth v. Hunt4 found their antonyms in the
severe repressive utterances of which that of Chief Justice Beasley of New
Jersey in State v. Donaldson5 is an outstanding example. Legislation easing
the severity of the older common law doctrines of conspiracy 6 was almost
contemporaneous with repressive statutes such as the famous La Salle Black
law of Illinois.7
The Sherman Act was enacted during this era. To argue that because no
national policy governing labor activities had then developed, the purpose
of that Act was not to embrace those activities, seems unwarranted. Though
it was admittedly concerned primarily with the growing power of trusts and
monopolies to interfere with accustomed competitive forces, nothing appears
in its language to indicate a clear conviction that the fear of that interference
could stem only from combinations of capital and not also from organizations
of laboring men.8 Instead, its words proscribing every combination and con-
spiracy in restraint of trade would seem calculated to embrace all combina-
tions and not merely those of the haves as distinguished from the have-nots.
Indeed, a good and an honest guess as to the intent of Congress in this
connection-if there can ever be any such thing as a real Congressional
intent-would seem to be that Congress by the use of these large and un-
44 Mete. 111 (Mass. 1842). Cf. Master Stevedores Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly 5 (N. Y.
1867).
532 N. J. L. 151 (1867). See also cases cited in LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1934)
35, note 213.6See, e.g., Ill. Laws 1873, c. 76; N. J. Laws 1877, c. 142; N. Y. Laws 1870, c. 18.
7111. Laws 1863, p. 70; Conn. Laws 1864, c. 57; Kan. Laws 1879, c. 134; Mich. Acts
1877, c. 11; Minn. Pen. Code 1885, § 138.
SThe legislative history of the Sherman Act has been exhaustively analyzed. The
conclusion has been reached both that this history proves that labor unions were intended
to be excluded from the Act and, contrariwise, that they were intended to be included
within the Act. See BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT (1930) ; MASON, ORGAN-
IZED LABOR AND THE LAW (1925) ; Emery, Labor Organizations and the Sherman Law
(1912) 20 J. POL. ECON. 599.
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defined words hoped that the courts, employing their customary powers of
exposition, might during the years fill the vacuum that then existed and
forge some adequate philosophy as to the relationship that the federal gov-
ernment should bear towards the many and various activities of organized
labor.9
If one should ponder in the abstract this language of the Sherman Act
as applied to combinations of labor and seek therefrom some test to distin-
guish the proscribed from the permitted activities, the natural inclination
would be to turn to common law precedents to see whether they might be
used to give that language relating to conspiracies and restraints of trade
real meaning. Of course, whatever restraints and conspiracies with which
the federal courts could deal, because of constitutional limitations, had to
concern themselves with interstate as distinguished from intrastate commerce.
The technique of distinguishing between interstate and intrastate commerce,
though admittedly difficult in the close cases and sometimes metaphysical at
best, was familiar and could presumably be adapted to this field. The area
of possible federal concern being thus determined, the next question would
be whether the particular activity was in restraint of such trade within the
meaning of the statute and hence illegal, or whether, despite the fact that
it might interfere with or affect normal industrial activity, it was nevertheless
without the statutory proscription. On this issue there was a wealth of
common law precedent, some of it bad, it is true, and yet malleable enough
in its principles to permit judges to reach those conclusions that they thought
right and wise under all the circumstances. For the common law in pricking
out the allowable area of strikes and boycotts and correlated activities had
used the old conceptions of conspiracy and restraint of trade-the very terms
employed by the Sherman Act-to distinguish the unlawful from the lawful
types. The doctrin4 that had been evolved made the illegality of such com-
binations depend either upon a judgment that the end sought was unlawful
or upon a conclusion that, irrespective of the lawfulness of the objective
sought, the means employed by the particular labor combination under
scrutiny were unlawful. True, in this connection there was a general tendency
on the part of judges to treat as unlawful ends that they deemed undesirable
or means that they disliked, but at least that technique forced judgment to
concern itself with the wisdom of objectives and the desirability of certain
types of economic weapons.
It is surprising as one looks back upon this episode of American legal
history-the judicial development of the Sherman Act-that some such
technique was not employed in dealing with combinations of labor under the
9See Landis, Book Review (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 875.
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Sherman Act, especially so, in that this very technique was employed in
dealing with combinations of capital. 10 Decisions twenty and thirty years
after the passage of the Sherman Act indicate some of the pitfalls that would
have attended this approach, but nothing in the early decisions which hewed
out a different line of departure indicates that these pitfalls were the reasons
for not introducing into federal law, so far as interstate commerce was con-
cerned, the common law conceptions of conspiracy and restraint of trade that
distinguished lawful from unlawful labor activity.
These pitfalls might be adverted to now before proceeding to the manner
in which Sherman Law doctrine developed. The first of them is that the
immense area embraced by the conception of interstate commerce might have
brought a large volume of labor cases into the federal courts. No significant
strike fails to restrain interstate commerce in the sense of interfering with
the normal entry into or transportation of goods in interstate commerce.
Unless the federal courts were to assume substantially complete jurisdiction
over labor controversies-a matter that we were unprepared for in 1890-
some barrier against the flood of such cases had to be provided. Creating
an appropriate barrier by distinguishing between lawful and unlawful re-
straints was complicated by the broad language of the statute, which pro-
scribed all forms of restraint. True by heroic interpretation, such as became
necessary years later in dealing with combinations of capital,"' this all in-
clusive phraseology of the statute could have been whittled down to sizeable
proportions by the invention of a rule of reason, but when the labor cases
first hit the courts no such conception was on the courts' horizons. In the
absence of such a rule even the simple, peaceful strike might be brought
within the ban of a statute that supposedly spoke for the liberal, progressive
consumer rather than the hard-shelled, hard-fisted industrialist.
A second difficulty in the way of absorbing into federal law the common
law doctrines applied by state courts to labor combinations, was the inequality
in treatment that would result from the three-fold damage clause of the
Sherman Act. A restraint punished by the state courts, if punishable for
the same reason by the federal courts because it restrained interstate com-
merce as distinguished from intrastate commerce, would subject the offenders
to three times the penalty that they might otherwise incur. Such a treatment,
though possibly the logical deduction that should be made from the Sherman
10See, e.g., the reliance by Harlan, J., on state authorities, which in turn rely upon the
older English authorities, in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.
197, 339-341, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1904), and the direct reliance upon the early English
authorities by White, C. J., in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221
U. S. 1, 51-59, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911).
"lUnited States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911)
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911).
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Act, certainly would commend itself neither to labor as a whole nor to that
normal American consumer whose genius had sought expression in the
Sherman Act. Instead, the three-fold penalty suggested that some additional
peculiar illegality attached to the restraints in interstate commerce that the
Sherman Law condemned as contrasted with those restraints already illegal
at common law.
How far these considerations actually motivated sub silentio the courts'
conclusions in the early cases, it is impossible to say. It is clear, however,
that the courts in theory and in expression struck out upon a different line
than that indicated by common law doctrine.
The first occasion upon which the issue of the applicability of the Sherman
Act to labor combinations was argued before the Supreme Court,12 that
Court found no occasion to announce its views upon the question. Though
refusing to disagree with the lower court which found Eugene Debs' instiga-
tion of his men to interfere with the movement of railroad cargoes and trains
a violation of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion
below but placed the right of the lower court to enjoin that action on the
broad and general ground that the United States could brook no such ob-
struction to the passage of interstate commerce or the carrying of the mails.'3
It is doubtful whether that hesitancy is significant. Unquestionably shocked
by the violence of the Pullman strike, the Court chose to rest its power to
deal with such a problem upon broad grounds of constitutional authority
rather than the narrower base of statutory duty.14
A decade later, however, the issue of the Sherman Act was pointedly
before the Court. Hatters in Danbury, Connecticut, sought to force collective
bargaining in their factory and, failing to persuade the management of the
desirability of their proposition, despite the fact that 70 out of 82 manu-
facturers in the country had acceded to similar terms, called a strike. And
then they did more. They persuaded the national union of which they were
a component part and the American Federation of Labor with which the
national union was affiliated to back their effort by urging their members
to refuse to patronize in any way any of the many distribution outlets in
12There is no need for our purposes here to review the early lower court decisions
holding that the Sherman Act applied to labor combinations. They are collected in
BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 8, appendix C.
131; re Debs, Petitioner, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).
14The validity of the premises underlying the Debs case is subject to considerable
question in the light of the opinion in the Apex case. The implications of the latter
opinion would seem to deny the authority of the federal courts to intervene to police the
interstate transportation or movement of goods in the absence of legislation authorizing
such action. The Court, however, points out that the public interest which was protected
independently of statute in the Debs case now is protected by legislation specially directed
to that end. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 486, note 5, 60 Sup. Ct. 982
(1940).
1941]
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various portions of the country that after warning might continue to handle
Danbury hats. Twice the Supreme Court concluded that this combination
was in violation of the Sherman Act.15
Neither of these two opinions, however,-the first by Chief Justice Fuller
on demurrer to the complaint, the second by Mr. Justice Holmes after trial
-points out with any exactitude just how this particular combination fell
afoul of the Sherman Act. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that the hats
moved in interstate commerce in the sense that after being manufactured
in Connecticut they were shipped and distributed throughout the United
States. Emphasis is also accorded the fact that the effort of the defendants
was to cripple and destroy the plaintiff's business unless he acceded to their
demands.
But if one asks specifically where the illegality stemmed from, there is
no clear answer in the opinion of these two Justices. Did it stem from the
desire to cripple the business? If so, that desire was as active in instigating
the strike as the boycott. Did it stem from the objective of the defendants,
in the sense that by unionizing this factory they were taking another impor-
tant and unlawful step toward unionizing the whole industry? Nothing in
the opinion clearly indicates that such an objective must be deemed to run
counter to the Sherman Act. Did it stem from the employment of economic
pressure outside the state of Connecticut to effect a result inside the state
-namely, the unionization of the factory? Such pressure, inasmuch as it
operates at the point of destination of goods in interstate commerce as dis-
tinguished from pressure, like a strike, operating at the point of origin, looks
superficially as if it is aimed more at destroying the interstate trade of the
manufacturer than the strike. But such a distinction is highly superficial
at best for interstate trade may in many situations be stifled as effectively
by a strike ,at ihe point of origin as by boycotts at the points of destination.
True, a distinction can be drawn upon the ground of employing a boycott
in addition to a strike, for the use of the boycott, especially if it is of the
so-called secondary type, may in some of its various forms be regarded as
undesirable because it inevitably means a spreading of the area of industrial
conflict and the participation of more people in that dispute. But none of
these distinctions are pointed to by the Court, nor is there anything in its
two opinions that indicates that the illegality of that particular combination
stemmed from its employment of the boycott as distinguished from the strike.
Instead the method of approach was to describe the picture as a whole, to
illustrate how it affected the movement of these hats in interstate commerce,
and then to condemn it as such.
15Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908) ; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S.
522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915).
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Of great interest, however, is the fact that neither opinion cites any com-
mon law authority to buttress the conclusion of the Court-common law
authority that might show that this type of restraint is unlawful and that
therefore, since interstate commerce was involved, the restraint also fell
within the ban of the Sherman Act. The absence of such authority is sig-
nificant for that absence gives fair warning that the test for distinguishing
between the labor combinations that are lawful under the Sherman Act and
those that are unlawful will be based upon considerations that the Court will
propose to draw out of that Act, rather than upon considerations derivable
from general common law doctrine in the labor field.
The World War had come and gone when the Court was next called upon
to elaborate the position it had taken in the Danbury Hatters cases. In 1921
the vicissitudes of industrial conflict so far as they affected the Duplex
Printing Press Company came to the attention of the Supreme Court. The
machinists' union had succeeded in unionizing three of the four manufacturers
in this country of newspaper printing presses. The fourth, the Duplex
Company, refused to be persuaded and insisted upon maintaining a wage
scale below that prevailing elsewhere. It thus threatened the union's power
to maintain its position in the other three factories. The union thereupon
struck the factory in Michigan. To make that strike effective the union
induced machinists in New York to refuse to assist in the installation of
Duplex presses, truck-drivers to refuse to haul them, and encouraged other
unionists to withdraw both labor and patronage from customers of the Duplex
Company.
The differences between the Duplex and the Danbury Hatters cases are
not great. One can, if one chooses, draw a distinction upon the basis that
the Duplex boycott was more tightly articulated than the Hatters' boycott,
in that the Hatters associated with themselves the members of all unions,
whereas the machinists used only their membership and that of closely related
trades. This distinction between tightly articulated boycotts and loose, gen-
eral boycotts had been drawn in the state courts, particularly in New York,",
where the cause of action in the case arose, but the majority of the Court
paid little attention to it. A more significant distinction between the two
cases lay in the fact that subsequent to the Danbury Hatters case the Clayton
Act had been passed.
There were brave words in that statute saying that "the labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce" and that nothing contained
in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid members of labor organiza-
tions "from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof."' 7 Some
36 Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917). Cf. Auburn Draying Co. v.
Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919).
17Act of Oct. 14, 1914, Sec. 6, 38 STAT. 731.
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men, such as Gompers, hoped for much from that statute.'8 Others, such
as Taft, then a professor of law at Yale University, doubted.19 The key
to that situation lay in the use of the phrase "legitimate object." Was that
an expanding concept, increasing the area of objectives that unions could
lawfully pursue, or was it static in content as simply declaratory of existing
doctrine ?20 Had a word such as "normal" or "labor" been used in the statute
instead of the curiously question-begging term "legitimate" the answer would
have been easier.
Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the Court,21 took Professor Taft's view
and thereby reduced those sections of the Clayton Act to sound and fury,
signifying nothing.22 But more than this he made plain the view that the
meaning of the Sherman Act was to be found purely by the process of
introspection and that common law doctrine as to the legality or illegality
of particular types of labor activity was immaterial.2 The process of intro-
spection suggested by Mr. Justice Pitney consisted in thinking about the
nature of restraints of interstate trade, and, if such a restraint were found,
whether affected by peaceful means or otherwise, to condemn it without
regard to the social or anti-social objective that it sought to attain. It was
thus easy for him to disregard the New York distinction between tightly
articulated boycotts and the loose, broad kind and apply the Danbury Hatters
doctrine to the facts at bar. More than this, he specifically rejected the
common law technique that would condemn restraints upon the basis of ends
sought or upon the basis of means employed. Neither the justifiability of
the objective, said Mr. Justice Pitney, nor the essential peaceableness of the
means employed would make legal what the Sherman Act upon other grounds
had made illegal.24
'
8 See (1914) 21 AmERICAN FEDERATIONIST 971.
19 See (1914) 39 A. B. A. REP. 359, 380.2 0 For the contention that the legislative history of Section 6 of the Clayton Act dis-
closes a Congressional intention to exempt labor unions from the Sherman Act and to
abrogate the doctrine of the Danbury Hatters case, see Brief on Behalf of Congress of
Industrial Organizations, Anticus Curiae, in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, supra note 1.
2 1 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).2 2 The task of applying a similar lethal technique to Section 20 of the Clayton Act was
reserved for Mr. Taft himself, when, in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921), as Chief Justice, he concluded
that the prohibitions of that section were to be interpreted as "introducing no new principle
into the equity jurisprudence" but as "merely declaratory of what was the best practice
always."
23"But, in determining the right to an injunction tinder that [the Clayton] Act and the
Sherman Act, it is of minor consequence whether either kind of boycott is lawful or
unlawful at common law or under the statutes of particular States. Those acts, passed in
the exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States, are of
paramount authority, and their prohibitions must be given full effect irrespective of
whether the things prohibited are lawful or unlawful at common law or under local
statutes." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 466, 41 Sup. Ct. 172
(1921).2 4
"It is settled by these decisions [Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301
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Mr. Justice Brandeis took a different view,25 but his opinion, so Tar as
our problem is concerned, needs attention only because of his insistence that
the Clayton Act had altered doctrine in that field. His position was that
Section 20 of the Clayton Act had legalized the employment of certain means
by employees, among them the refusal to patronize, irrespective of the
objectives that they thereby sought to promote. He reached this conclusion
because he thought that that Act sought to analogize the American to the
British treatment of the problem.2 6 In protest against the common law doc-
trine that permitted courts to declare illegal combinations of employees be-
cause they disapproved of the ends they fostered, irrespective of the legality
or illegality of the means they employed, England had restricted judicial
interference to cases where independently illegal means, other than the mere
threat to strike or the refusal to patronize, were employed. England thus
had forbade judicial interference simply upon the ground that the objective
might be regarded by the courts as undesirable, limiting that interference
to the punishment and restraint of those independently tortious acts that
workmen might commit.27  But Mr. Justice Brandeis' interpretation of the
Clayton Act found only two other supporters on the Court, while the con-
clusion that the Act meant little or nothing appealed to the remaining six.
One can move from the Duplex to the Bedford Cut Stone case of 1927,28
(1908) ; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915) ; Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 34 Sup. Ct. 951 (1913)] that
such a restraint produced by peaceable persuasion is as much within the prohibition as
one accomplished by force or threats of force; and it is not to be justified by the fact
that the participants in the combination or conspiracy may have some object beneficial
to themselves or their associates which possibly they might have been at liberty to pur-
sue in the absence of the statute." Id. at 467-8. The latter statement assumes that the
Sherman Act goes further than the common law in penalizing those activities of labor
unions because for some reason, not defined, they are found to be "in restraint of trade."2 5Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Clarke concurred with Mr. Justice Brandeis.26
"By 1914 the ideas of the advocates of legislation had fairly crystallized upon the
manner in which the inequality and .uncertainty of the law should be removed. It was
to be done by expressly legalizing certain acts regardless of the effects produced by them
upon other persons. As to them Congress was to extract the element of iinuria from the
damages thereby inflicted, instead of leaving judges to determine according to their own
economic and social views whether the damage inflicted on an employer in an industrial
struggle was dainnum absque injuria, because an incident of trade competition, or a legal
injury, because in their opinion, economically and socially objectionable. This idea was
presented to the committees which reported the Clayton Act. The resulting law set out
certain acts which had previously been held unlawful, whenever courts had disapproved
of the ends for which they were performed; it then declared that, when these acts were
committed in the course of an industrial dispute, they should not be held to violate any
law of the United States. In other words the Clayton Act substituted the opinion of
Congress as to the propriety of the purpose for that of differing judges; and thereby it
declared that the relations between employers of labor and workingmen were competitive
relations, that organized competition was not harmful and that it justified injuries
necessarily inflicted in its course." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443,
485-6, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).2 7 See LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1934) 28.
28Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct.
522 (1927).
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find a very similar series of facts, a similar disposition of the controversy
and little addition to doctrine. The only real mortar to be found in that
particular piece of building is the suggestion made by two dissenting and
one concurring Justice29 -Brandeis, Holmes and Stone-that something akin
to the rule of reason should be employed to distinguish justifiable labor
combinations from those that the Sherman Act should be interpreted to
condemn.30 That suggestion, though grounded upon the Standard Oil case,
is in essence an attempt to introduce into the labor field the older common
law doctrine that drew distinctions between labor combinations upon the
basis of the objectives that they sought to attain. Appealing as it is, both
upon the ground of its intrinsic merit and upon the ground that it tended
to make Sherman law doctrine applying to combinations of labor conform
to that applicable to combinations of capital, the suggestion came too late.
Development upon bases other than those which distinguished between
reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade had too long characterized
judicial handling of these problems.31
Thus far the cases considered are those in which both a boycott and a
strike were involved and in which the boycott, carried on in a state other
than that where the strike occurred, had as its immediate aim the effectuation
of a result at the point of manufacture of the goods. Was such a boycott
an essential ingredient of a Sherman Act violation because of its operative
effect at the point of destination of goods shipped in interstate commerce,3 2
20Mr. Justice Sanford, like Mr. Justice Stone, concurred upon the ground that the
Duplex case was controlling, but Mr. Justice Sanford did not express a concurrence in the
view that a rule of reason should be applicable to these labor cases.
801t should be noted, however, that in the Duplex case Mr. Justice Brandeis had urged
that Section 20 of the Clayton Act was intended to prevent courts from indulging in those
social judgments that necessarily inhere in the application of any rule of reason. See
note 26, supra. Having been driven from that position, he took a new stand upon this
ground.31Mr. Justice Sutherland specifically rejected the contention that the claimed justifi-
ability of the end was relevant to a determination of whether or not the restraint was in
violation of the Sherman Act upon the ground that that question had been settled by the
Duplex case. Mr. Justice Brandeis was admittedly in a difficult position in now insisting
upon the criterion of reasonableness, for he had since the Duplex case concurred in
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551 (1925), where
a strike was held to be in violation of the Sherman Act upon the basis of criteria which
had no concern with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the objective that the
strikers were pursuing. To avoid the argument that his concurrence in the technique
employed by the Court in this and other cases, such as United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922) ; United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265
U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623 (1924), and Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 45
Sup. Ct. 403 (1925), had precluded him from now insisting upon a standard of reasonable-
ness, he replied that in these cases "the questions put in issue were not the reasonableness of
the restraint, but whether the restraint was of interstate commerce." Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, supra note 28, at 64.32The fact that the boycott must be carried on in one state to effectuate a result in
another state seems an essential requisite of this line of cases. A boycott, even though it be
upon goods that have moved in interstate commerce, destined to effect a result in the state
[Vol. 26
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or could the Sherman Act be violated by restraints which though limited
to the point of origin effectively prevented goods from ever entering into
interstate commerce?
This question came to a head in three cases that the Court was called
upon to decide between 1922 and 1925. A coal operator in the formerly
unionized district of western Arkansas decided that his mines would go not
only open shop but would give up the practice of collective bargaining that.
theretofore had prevailed in his district. His action in this respect was not
unusual. A weakness was creeping into the union movement in certain
sections of the coal industry. The competition of mines in strong non-union
territory, particularly West Virginia, was making itself felt in the union
fields and union operators handicapped by the union wage and hour scale
were losing out in the terrific competition for markets that characterized the
coal industry. To keep these union operators from going non-union some
efforts had to be made to relieve this increasing pressure from non-union
fields. The Coronado Coal Company in western Arkansas, however, decided
that the pressure of non-union competition was too severe and determined
to go non-union. That decision incited a veritable rebellion among its men.
They not only struck but resorted to pillage, arson and murder to cripple
the business of their employer. Indeed, the action of employees in the recent
sit-down strikes seems peaceful when contrasted with the illegal and criminal
tactics pursued by these miners of western Arkansas.
The company retorted by an action for three-fold damages under the
Sherman Act. From a verdict and judgment for $745,600 the local union
appealed to the Supreme Court. That Court upset this judgment and con-
cluded that the conspiracy shown was not within the ambit of the Sherman
Act.3 3
There was no doubt but that unlawful means had been used by the union
and that the effect of those means' was to reduce the supply of coal going
into interstate commerce and that the union knew that this would be the
effect of its action. There was also no doubt but that the union was conscious
where the boycott is operative, seemingly falls within the category of the strike cases
subsequently discussed. Because this is not a "direct" restraint of interstate commerce
some additional objective is needed to bring it within the Sherman Act, an objective of
a type that is sufficient to make what is normally indirect "direct." Industrial Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 45 Sup. Ct. 403 (1925); Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Morrin, 289 U. S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 549 (1933). It is this line of cases that the Department
of Justice is now seeking to upset in its effort to reverse the lower court decision in
United States v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600 (E. D. Mo. 1940). Difficulty occurs in cases
where the boycott though having an intrastate objective is operating upon goods which
may still be regarded as being in interstate commerce. Compare Aeolian Co. v. Fischer,
40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), with Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 35 F. (2d) 34 (S. D.
N. Y. 1929).33United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922).
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of the serious competition that union mines were receiving from non-union
coal in interstate markets and that it realized that reduction or elimination
of that competitive pressure was essential for maintaining the gains it had
already made. But the Court viewed the case as one where the primary
objective of the union was to correct a local situation. Following prior ex
cathedra announcements to the effect that coal mining and manufacture were
not interstate commerce, even though the coal mined and the goods manu-
factured were later shipped in interstate commerce, it concluded that an
obstruction to such manufacture or mining, though patently affecting inter-
state commerce and even though produced by illegal and highly criminal
means, was not a "direct" restraint upon it and hence not a violation of the
Sherman Act. 4The boycott, on the other hand, the Court observed, was one
of those direct and therefore penal restraints.
Comment need hardly be made upon the essential difficulty of trying to
judge when a restraint is a direct obstruction of interstate commerce and
when it is only an indirect one. Restraints may be aimed at manufacture,
at transportation, and at distribution after the major processes of transporta-
tion have taken place. If "directness" was to be the test and "directness"
meant the nearness of the relationship between the restraint and the physical
fact of goods moving in interstate commerce, were lines to be drawn between
these three different processes, regardless of the general effect of the restraint
in reducing the flow of goods in interstate commerce-an effort that could
be produced by a restraint upon manufacture as well as by a restraint upon
distribution or upon transportation?
Thus far the position of the Court was that a restraint upon distribution
to effect a result at the point of origin was illegal despite the objectives of
those who participated in the restraint. With regard to a restraint operating
upon transportation, such as a strike of railroad employees or of interstate
truck drivers, it had not as yet spoken, but, if "directness" were to be the
test, certainly no more direct obstruction of interstate commerce could be
imagined than such activity. If so, here again both objectives and means that
might be employed would seem to be immaterial.34 As to the restraints upon
34The lower federal courts had dealt with restraints upon transportation. But in those
cases where they had concluded that the conduct was in violation of the Sherman Act,
illegal means had always been employed. Thus the line between the legal and illegal
restraint in this field may rest upon the nature of the means employed, though these courts
have never clearly enunciated such a test. United States v. Anderson, 101 F. (2d) 325
(C. C. A. 7th 1939), cert. denied, 307 U. S. 625 (1939) ; Vandell v. United States, 6 F.(2d) 188 (C. C. A. 2d 1925); Williams v. United States, 295 Fed. 302 (C. C. A. 5th
1923); O'Brien v. United States, 290 Fed. 185 (C. C. A. 6th 1923); United States v.
Railway Employees' Dep't A. F. of L., 290 Fed. 978 (N. D. -Ill. 1923). But cf. United
States v. Norris, 255 Fed. 423 (N. D. Ill. 1918). In the early cases a similar approach
was made, that is, that a restraint which by illegal means prevents the transportation of
goods in interstate commerce is a violation of the Act. United States v. Workingmen's
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manufacture, knowledge and hence legal intent that the restraint would
operate to prevent goods from entering into interstate commerce and thus
reduce the supply of goods moving in interstate commerce, the Court in
the first Coronado case regarded as insufficient proof of that directness that
was essential for the Sherman Act. Nor would the addition of highly
criminal and illegal means suffice to make direct what was otherwise merely
indirect.
With regard to restraints upon manufacture, obviously some limit had to
be imposed upon the federal jurisdiction, for otherwise almost every strike
would fall within the purview of the Sherman Act. That consequence the
Court acutely recognized, when in the second of these cases-the Herkert
case 35-it declined to treat as violative of the Sherman Act a strike accon-
panied by illegal picketing and intimidation in a trunk factory more than
90 per cent of whose product was shipped outside the state of manufacture
for sale. But in disposing of this case the Court took occasion to try to
pack some further meaning into its litmus test of "direct." To be a direct
obstruction to interstate commerce and hence unlawful, the Court said, the
intent of the conspirators or the necessary effect of their action must be
somehow to enable them "to monopolize the supply [of the article], control
its price or discriminate as between its would-be purchasers." 6 "Directness,"
if this be true, is thus a means for distinguishing between restraints upon
manufacture not on the ground of tactics37 or of effect in reducing the supply
of goods moving in interstate commerce,38 but upon the ground of objectives.
Thus objectives which had been regarded as immaterial to the legality or
illegality of a boycott became the prime test as to the legality or illegality
of a strike.
When the Coronado case for the second time came to the Supreme Court,
that Court found occasion to apply these general remarks to a concrete
Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (C. C. E. D. La. 1893), aff'd, 57 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 5th
1893); Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 62 Fed. 803 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1894).
If means in these cases are the test of the illegality of the restraint, then "directness" in
this field has another and different meaning. This question is further considered infra
in the discussion of Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in the Apex case. See notes 42 and 43,
infra.
85United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623 (1924).
361d. at 471.
3 1n the first Coronado case, however, Chief Justice Taft laid emphasis upon the
illegality of the means as well as the illegality of the objective. "If unlawful means had
here been used by the National body to unionize mines whose product was important,
actually or potentially, in affecting prices in interstate commerce, the evidence in question
would clearly tend to show that that body was guilty of an actionable conspiracy under
the Anti-Trust Act." United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., supra note 33, at 409.38Effect, it will be noted, as such is not controlling, but effect in the reduction of
supply may be such as to give a basis for deducing the possession of one of the illegal
objectives.
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situation.8 9 On the second trial of that case considerable evidence was intro-
duced to show that the union involved called the strike because of its belief
that the union mines were threatened by the flow of this particular non-union
coal into interstate markets. Freed from the union scale these operators could
supply a substantial amount of coal to purchasers at a lower price and hence
were taking away the market from union operators and thereby severely
challenging the ability of the union to hold its existing gains. Thus, because
the union had its eye primarily upon the interstate markets for coal in order
to protect existing union territory from non-union competition, rather than
being primarily concerned with the situation in the particular mines where
the strike was called, what had been merely an indirect and innocent restraint
of commerce became a direct and penal restraint.
This turn of doctrine means that so far as strikes are concerned their
legality or illegality will depend upon the hierarchy of objectives which the
courts may see behind them. The difficulty with such an approach is the
assumption that objectives are both single and simple or if double or triple,
are then primary and ancillary. The effort to unionize a mine, for example,
may be not only to unionize that mine and thereby improve conditions at
that mine but also to increase the area of unionized territory in order to
lessen the competitive pressures always threatening such gains as may already
have been made. The latter aim, for some reason not disclosed, the Court
regarded as unlawful, but only unlawful if somehow judge or jury found
that aim to be more dominant than the aim of merely seeking to unionize
a mine.4
0
89Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551 (1925).401t is difficult to understand the role that the legality or illegality of the means plays
in the doctrine evolved in these three cases. Illegal means clearly cannot make a restraint
that otherwise would not violate the Sherman Act an illegal restraint for the proscribed
objective is wanting. But in addition to the proscribed objective must there also be
the employment of illegal means? There is an indication that some manner of illegal
means is also necessary. See note 37, supra. Otherwise the second Coronado case stands
for the proposition that an effort to unionize an industry in which non-union competition
threatens the maintenance of union standards is an objective that cannot be pursued under
the Sherman Act. If so, any effort made by the United Mine Workers to organize
the West Virginia fields would have violated the Sherman Act. But if the additional
requirement of illegal means is read into the second Coronado case, the case then stands
merely for the proposition that such an effort cannot under the Sherman Act be pursued
by illegal means. How confused the Supreme Court left this issue is evidenced by Judge
Parker's treatment of this problem in the Red Jacket case. International Organization,
etc. v. Red Jacket C. C. & C. Co., 18 F. (Zd) 839 (C. C. A. 4th 1927). The proscribed
objective-unionization of competing non-union territory-was there clearly present. But
Judge Parker relies upon little else than that that end was to be attained by a series of
strikes in order to conclude that the restraint was in violation of the Sherman Act. He
thus either implicitly rejected the requirement of illegal means or regarded the threats
to strike, etc., as supplying that requirement. Had he hewn more closely to the require-
ment of independently illegal means, some of the criticism he received would undoubtedly
have been avoided. But that on this issue he may have misinterpreted the second
Coronado case is not surprising.
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Subsequent decisions under the Sherman Act add little to those doctrines.
If we then try to sum up the situation prior to the Apex case, we can say
that restraints on distribution violate the Sherman Act, independently of
their objective or the peacefulness of the means they may employ, at least
if they seek to affect a situation at gome point in a state other than that
where the restraint is active; that restraints upon manufacture do not offend
the Sherman Act, despite tortious and criminal means employed, unless they
have as their primary objective the effectuation of monopoly, price-control,
price discrimination or the like, even though, as in the effort to unionize an
industry such an objective may be sought not for itself but because it is
essential to the attainment of some one of the normal labor objectives such
as wages, hours, or collective bargaining. As to restraints upon the act of
transportation, the Court had had no occasion to comment upon them, but
if the test of directness is at all a type of test that would accord with the
common use of language, all restraints of this character are direct and hence
unlawful, at least if illegal means are employed.
In the years that passed between the development of this doctrine and
the Apex case, the National Labor Relations Act had been upheld in a series
of decisions. 41 I need not comment upon them save to observe that the law
there evolved tended to destroy distinctions that the Court had earlier erected
limiting the conception of interstate commerce to acts of transportation as
distinguished from the processes of manufacture. Those distinctions, how-
ever, were essential to the doctrine developed under the Sherman Act. Con-
sequently the undermining of the traditional metaphysics by the Labor B3oard
cases called for a radical revision of Sherman Law doctrine. This, despite
the protestations of the Court in its opinion to the contrary, is what happened
in the Apex case.
The facts of the Apex case are simple-a violent sit-down strike in a
hosiery factory in Philadelphia, most of whose product was shipped in
interstate commerce, accompanied by assaults and destruction of physical
property, together with a conscious refusal to lift the sit-down strike to permit
completion of contracts calling for the shipment of thousands of pairs of
hosiery to out-of-state purchasers. The Court that decided the Herkert and
Coronado cases could hardly consistently with them have held this conduct
to violate the Sherman Act, for the restraint being upon manufacture, none
of that additional intent was present that under the doctrine of these cases
4 lAmong the more significant of these are the following: National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1927) ; National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58, 57 Sup. Ct. 645 (1937) ;
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct.
206 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 59 Sup. Ct.
668 (1939).
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was necessary for a violation of the Sherman Act.42 Illegality or criminality
of tactics, as in the Coronado, case, was irrelevant for these factors would
not supply the essential intent. But, if the effect of the Labor Board cases
was to make manufacturing partake of interstate commerce to the same
degree that transportation was interstate commerce, a new directness would
now attach to the restraint. Additional intent, in the sense of the Herkert
case, would be unnecessary and the restraint involved in the Apex case would
consequently be a direct obstruction upon interstate commerce and hence
banned by the Sherman Act.
The majority, however, retreated from the consequences that they felt were
implicit in such an approach. For if that approach were to be law, not only
would strikes that might cripple railroad operation, interstate transport by
air or bus violate the Sherman Act, but strikes in ordinary manufacturing
industries might have the same result. No line could then be drawn but one
that would depend upon the illegality or legality of the means employed.
Upon the federal courts would thus be thrust the duty of policing the major
portion of American industrial strife with the crude bludgeons provided by
the Sherman Act.43 That prospect could scarcely please, especially judges
42The only way in which the restraint in the Apex case could have been regarded as
illegal under the Sherman Act without regard to the shift in doctrine brought about by
the Labor Board cases would have been to follow the technique employed in O'Brien v.
United States, 290 Fed. 185 (C. C. A. 6th 1924), and United States v. Norris, 255 Fed. 423
(N. D. Ill. 1918). See note 34, supra. This would be to make everything hinge upon the
tortious refusal of the strikers to permit the hosiery to be shipped to out-of-state purchasers.
treat this as not being merely a prevention of manufacture but as a prevention of trans-
portation, and hence conclude that a "direct" violation of the Sherman Act was in-
volved. This approach, of course, makes illegality depend upon one incident that occurred
during the strike rather than making that illegality stem from the character of the strike
as a whole. It is this that makes the doctrines evolved in the O'Brien and Norris cases
undesirable for criminality tends to attach to an entire strike because of certain sporadic
action taken in conjunction with a strike that happens to disrupt transportation. It
should be recognized that the strike in being aimed at preventing manufacture seeks also
to destroy that transportation that is the normal resultant of manufacture. That the
strikers in their avidity to bring the plant to a standstill may incidentally stop transporta-
tion directly should not make the strike a conspiracy if it would not become so by actually
stopping manufacture. To accept the doctrine of the O'Brien and Norris cases would
mean that the Sherman Act would be used to police industry in a manner that the Court
sought to avoid in the Herkert case.43It is not easy to discover just what the theory is that underlay the dissenting opinion
in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, supra note 1. Chief Justice Hughes seems to make the
illegality hinge upon the prevention of the shipment of the finished goods to customers
outside the state rather than the stoppage of production-an artificial distinction at
best. See note 42, stpra. It is this "deliberate" prevention that the Chief Justice
states was the "direct and intentional prevention of interstate commerce in the
furtherance of an illegal conspiracy." Id. at 514. By "deliberate" does the Chief Justice
mean something more than intentional, that is, prevention by illegal means? If so, the
language employed is unfortunately obscure. If "deliberate" is to be given its normal
meaning every railroad strike, for example, would be a violation of the Sherman Act.
There is much in his opinion to suggest that the Chief Justice held the latter view. He
not only approves the holdings of the lower federal courts in United States v. Working-
men's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (C. C. E. D. La. 1893), af'd, 57 Fed. 85 (C. C. A.
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still cognizant of the unfavorable judgment of Congress, as contained in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, upon their former administration of the same broad
field through their equitable injunctive powers. In the light of the public
reaction to the government by injunction that characterized the twenties, it
was natural to hesitate to assert that the slender and tenuous base of the
Sherman Act required judges to assume a similar responsibility to govern
vast areas of industrial strife by indictment and by the penalty of three-fold
damages.
Mr. Justice Stone led this school of thought. To do so he was required
in the Apex case to fashion new doctrine though naturally he purports merely
to apply old law. Two propositions sum up his approach. These two must
of necessity be paraphrased because the amenities of judicial conversation
require judges on occasion to conceal rather than reveal the implications
of their thought. The first 4 of Mr. Justice Stone's propositions is that any
5th 1893) and United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1894), cases of rail-
road strikes in which illegal means were employed, but does so merely upon the general
ground that the defendants there "obstructed" and "prevented" transportation rather than
that they accomplished these results by illegal means. Concluding his review of these
cases, he says: "In the light of these decisions of the circuit courts and of the significant
and unanimous expressions by this Court [in Loewe v. Lawlor and Lawlor v. Loewe, where,
as it was pointed out earlier, the Court found the restraints illegal because their aim was
to "cripple" the defendant's business], the argument seems to be untenable that the Sherman
Act has been regarded as not extending to conspiracies to obstruct or prevent transporta-
tion in interstate or foreign commerce. On the contrary, I think that hitherto it has not
been supposed that such conspiracies lay outside the Act." Id. at 521. He goes on:
"Suppose, for example, there should be a conspiracy among the teamsters and truck drivers
in New York City to prevent the hauling of goods and their transportation in interstate
commerce, can it be doubted that the Sherman Act would apply?" Id. at 526. It is only at
the every end of his opinion that the suggestion is made in terms, still far from clear, that
the use of illegal means may be a necessary element of these "conspiracies" "directly"
"to prevent interstate transportation." He there says: "It is said that such a view would
bring practically every strike in modern industry within the application of the statute.
I do not agree. The right to quit work, the right peaceably to persuade others to quit
work, the right to proceed by lawful measures within the contemplation of the Clayton Act
to attain the legitimate objects of labor organization, is to my mind quite a different matter
from a conspiracy directly and intentionally to prevent the shipment of goods in inter-
state commerce either by their illegal seizure for that purpose, or by the direct and
intentional obstruction of their transportation or by blocking the highways of interstate
intercourse." Id. at 529. One is thus left still in doubt as to the legality of strikes aimed
at transportation which employ no illegal means.44Mr. Justice Stone in the prelude to his opinion rejects the contention that the Sherman
Act was not intended to apply to labor unions, primarily upon the ground that the "long
time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the
enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction
as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the
correct one." Id. at 488. He makes no mention of the stronger contention which was
before the Court that the Clayton Act was an attempt to reverse the legislative interpreta-
tion made in Lawlor v. Loewe. Compare Mr. Justice Stone's treatment of the problem
with that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, then a Professor at the Harvard Law School, in the
Foreword to BERMAN, LAaOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT (1930) xiv: "Yet labor consistently
denies that its activities are even subject to the Sherman Law. Though it has been
judicially settled since 1908 that labor is amenable to the Sherman Law, the question is
not closed for historians and it is wide open in the minds of labor. If moral assent to
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restraint, whether of capital or labor, to be illegal under the Sherman Act,
must have as its aim the desire to suppress the forces of competition which
otherwise are assumedly active in the marketing of goods and services.
This concept of interference with commercial competition is not too clear,
but the Justice seeks to make it concrete by examples. Thus where the aim
is one to restrain free competition in business and commercial transactions
by restricting production, by fixing prices, by dividing marketing territories,
by apportioning customers or the like, the restraint seeks to interfere with
commercial competition.45 But merely preventing substantial interstate ship-
ments in order to enforce ordinary labor demands is not such an aim. There
must in addition be this further objective of interfering with commercial
competition-an objective of the general type comprehended by the common
law conceptions of restraint of trade-as a necessary condition for the appli-
cation of the Sherman Act. This proposition, it will be seen, reintroduces
common law doctrine into this branch of labor law, an approach that was
specifically eschewed by Mr. Justice Pitney in 1921. But the common law
doctrine introduced by Mr. Justice Stone is the common law doctrine of
restraint of trade as applied to combinations of capital rather than those
doctrines of restraint of trade and conspiracy developed by the common law
to deal with combinations of labor.
The second of Mr. Justice Stone's propositions breathes life into the
Clayton Act that twenty years ago Mr. Justice Pitney and Chief Justice
Taft had read out of existence. Any combination of employees, Mr. Justice
Stone observes, tends to curtail the competitive forces that otherwise are
operative in the sale of employees' services to their employers. That type
of restraint is obviously designed to raise the price of labor, but nevertheless
as such it finds specific sanction, if not at common law, in the language of
the Clayton Act.
These two propositions easily disposed of the case at bar. Admitting the
existence of a restraint on interstate commerce caused by the prevention of
manufacture, there was absent any intent on the part of the strikers to do
otherwise than raise the price of their own product, labor-a justifiable
objective of combination.
But though these principles conclude the disposition of the particular case,
how far can they be said to clear the decks for disposition of other contro-
versies? Are the distinctions formerly made between restraints upon manu-
the authority of a law is of vital importance to the reign of law in a democracy, it can
never be too late or too academic to examine the grounds on which rest even so well
settled a doctrine as that the Sherman Law governs the activities of labor organizations.
And the scope of its applicability, in any event, will continue to present issues of policy
for the judgment of courts."
45Id. at 497.
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facture, transportation and distribution to be maintained? Is the boycott
to be handled differently from the strike? Is the effort by a boycott or by
a strike to unionize an entire industry still to be regarded as unlawful?
What means can be employed to prevent price competition based upon lower
labor costs arising .from the lack of union wage scales in portions of an
industry, or to prevent the introduction of competitive materials of a grade
cheaper only because of methods of manufacture that labor deems deleterious
to its interests? What of the objective of resisting that technological unem-
ployment that results as a consequence of the introduction of more mechanized
methods of manufacture? And finally, what of the objective of one union
seeking to destroy another union by pressure brought upon the employers
of members of the latter union?
Unfortunately the Court is yague on these matters. One point seems clear
and that is that no distinction will be drawn between restraints merely be-
cause one operates only upon manufacture and the other on actual trans-
portation. The tests for the legality of a railroad strike, for example, will
be the same under the Sherman Act as those that are applicable to a strike
in a steel plant. But the other issues still remain shrouded save for a hint
that the elimination of price competition based upon variations in labor costs
falls within the class of objectives made justifiable by the Clayton Act.40
If this be true, despite the apparent reconciliation affected by Mr. justice
Stone between his principles and the earlier cases,47 nothing really remains
46The significant passage is the following: "Strikes or agreements not to work, entered
into by laborers to compel employers to yield to their demands, may restrict to some
extent the power of employers who are parties to the dispute to compete in the market
with those not subject to such demands. But under the doctrine -applied to non-labor
cases, the mere fact of such restrictions on competition does not in itself bring the parties
to the agreement within the condemnation of the Sherman Act. Appalachian Coal v.
United States, supra, [288 U. S.] 360. Furthermore, successful union activity, as for
example consummation of a wage agreement with employers, may have some influence
on price competition by eliminating that part of such competition which is based on
differences in labor standards. Since, in order to render a labor combination effective
it must eliminate the competition from non-union made goods, see American. Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209, an elimination of price
competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor
organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of
curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act. See Levering &
Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, supra; cf. American, Steel Foundries case, supra, 209; National
Association of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U. S. 403." Id. at 503-4.47The effort to reconcile these earlier cases, hardly convinces. Of the Duplex and the
Bedford cases, the Justice says that, though these cases followed the enactment of the
Clayton Act and the recognition of the rule of reason in the Standard Oil cases, "the
applicability of that rule to restraints upon commerce affected by a labor union in order to
promote and consolidate the interests of its union was not considered." The learned
Justice seems to assume that his own dissent and that of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
Bedford case were written merely for the delectation of the public and not for the
"consideration" of the majority of his brethren. He also forgets Mr. justice Pitney's
specific insistence that the social justifiability of the end pursued by the union in the
Duplex case was irrelevant to the question of whether its activity violated the Sherman
Act.
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of their announced doctrine. All of them, the Danbury Hatters case, the
Duplex case, the Bedford Cut Stone case, the second Coronado case, had
that objective in view. If an attempt to control commercial competition be-
tween union and non-union goods is now legal because that control is for
the purpose of effecting the normal labor objectives of increased wages,
improved hours, increased employment, or the preservation of an existing
system of collective bargaining, a very profound change has taken place.
To save anything of the former doctrine the Supreme Court will have to
turn its attention to grounds that may exist for distinguishing the collective
employment of the refusal to labor from the collective employment of the
refusal to patronize, or find means to limit in some fashion the use of the
strike and the boycott by persons only mediately and not immediately con-
nected with a particular industrial discontent. Adequate rationalization of
such distinctions is the real crux of labor law, for it forces thought to con-
cern itself not with the metaphysics of the conception of interstate commerce
but with the reality of what economic weapons our society will permit labor
to use to gain its ends. Thus far the Supreme Court has contributed little
to our thinking in this field. It has decided cases, it is true, involving these
issues, but the grounds of these decisions have been concealed behind the
factitious screens of direct and indirect or obscured by legalistic and technical
conceptions of the nature of interstate commerce. It will now be forced to
face the realities of economic conflict and thereby fashion more realistically
the allowable area of collective labor activity.
It may well be that nothing resembling the former doctrine will ultimately
be saved, and that the rule that will develop will be that labor combinations,
irrespective of the means they employ, whether strike or boycott, will not
be regarded as violating the Sherman Act provided that their objective is a
normal labor objective. There is much in Mr. Justice Stone's opinion to
suggest that such a principle underlies his thought. If so the ultimate effect
of the Apex decision will actually be to read labor unions out of the Sherman
Act so far as their activities are directed toward the promotion of those
ends4 -- the improvement of labor conditions-upon which their justification
alone can rest. That effect would realize the hopes entertained by those
sponsors of the "new freedom" who in 1915 wrote into the Clayton Act brave
but ineffective words of encouragement.
49
48Cases like United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, 47 Sup. Ct. 169 (1926) and Local 167
v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 54 Sup. Ct. 396 (1934) are distinguishable upon this
ground. Cf. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 60 Sup. Ct. 182 (1939). It is of
interest that even the C. I. 0. in its brief as amicus curiae in the Apex case admitted the
validity of these cases, arguing that the immunity that they urged labor unions had under
a proper interpretation of the Sherman Act would not apply when labor unions were
seeking to pursue other than labor objectives. See Brief, p. 59.49See President Wilson's address of Sept. 2, 1916 accepting his renomination, 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON (1924) 302, 307.
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One thing is certain. The announced policies that the Department of
Justice indicated that it would pursue with regard to labor combinations will
call for radical revision.50 Those policies, as set forth by Assistant Attorney
General Arnold in his famous letter to the Secretary of the Central Labor
Union of Indianapolis, 51 will have to be materially modified in the light of
the Apex case. 52 Of the five types of illegal labor restraints that Mr. Arnold
there sets forth, only one-labor participation in price-fixing agreements-
seems, since the Apex case, clearly within the ambit of the Sherman Act.
The others that are described as consisting of "unreasonable" restraints to
prevent the use of cheaper materials, improved equipment, or more efficient
methods, to compel the hiring of useless and unnecessary labor, to destroy
an established and legitimate system of collective bargaining,5 3 to enforce
systems of graft and corruption, may, perhaps, fall within the Sherman Act;
but, if they do, they do so because of incidents that attend these efforts not
made explicit in Mr. Arnold's statement of doctrine. Even the most vicious
of these restraints-that to enforce systems of corruption and graft-may
operate with the concern of graft alone in mind with no desire or appreciable
effect of restricting commercial competition and hence not be illegal under
the Sherman Act. But since the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, there is no
need to complain of this result for another weapon to police this species of
corruption is now possessed by the Federal Government. 4
G0For a penetrating criticism of this statement antedating the Apex case, see The Folk-
Law of Thurman Arnold (1939) 8 INT. JUniD. Ass'N BuLL. 53.51This letter of Nov. 20, 1939 is conveniently found in (1939) 5 L. R. R. 316. See
also ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940) 249.52 0ne aspect of these policies is now at issue in the case of United States v. Hutcheson,
32 F. Supp. 600 (E. D. Mo. 1940), on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The announced policies, even before the Apex case, did not govern the Depart-
ment's action. In United States v. Gold, 115 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d 1940), the Depart-
ment prosecuted officials of the Needle Trades Workers' Industrial Union for seeking by
picketing, intimidation, etc., to compel the unionization of non-union fur dressers and dyers
located in New Jersey, to whom skins were shipped by New York City furriers for dressing
and dyeing. The attack by picketing, intimidation, etc., was made not only at the New
Jersey plants but at the plants of those furriers in New York City who dealt with the
New Jersey dressers and dyers. Though this grew out of an inter-union dispute between
Needle Workers and the International Fur Workers, the case made under the Sherman
Act related to the union's efforts to unionize the three non-union plants. Though the case
has elements in common with the Duplex and Bedford cases, it is impossible to fit it
within any of the five categories mentioned by Assistant Attorney General Arnold. The
convictions below were reversed upon the strength of the Apex case.
Mr. Arnold in an appendix to his chapter on labor in his Bottlenecks of Business (1940)
-a chapter which was obviously written before the Apex case-states that the result of
the Apex case appears to be to support the prosecution policy of the Department just
described. Id. at 319. The comment, however, is obviously too superficial and too casual
to merit serious attention as the considered judgment of the head of the Department's
Anti-Trust Division.
5 3 For a thoughtful criticism of the Department of Justice's position in attempting to
control the area and manner of jurisdictional strikes, see Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes in
Search of a Forum (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 424.5 4See 48 STAT. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 420 a-e (Supp. 1940).
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From a popular standpoint the Apex case can be considered as a very
significant victory for organized labor. Of course, it does not legalize a vio-
lent or a sit-down strike. Indeed the very defendants in the Apex case are
now defendants in a tort action in a state court-the appropriate tribunal
for the adjudication of claims of assault and malicious destruction of prop-
erty. But it does mean that the effort to precipitate the federal courts into
policing the details of industrial strife failed and that the forties will not
see a resuscitation of many of the unfortunate consequences that attended
government by injunction in the twenties.
From a legal standpoint the Apex case means a much more realistic effort
to deal with the appropriate responsibility that the Sherman Act thrusts
upon organized labor, for by applying tests to combinations of labor akin to
those applied to combinations of capital, it has instructed both to beware
of using their powers to upset the competitive forces that otherwise should
control prices of commodities other than labor in our interstate markets.
It permits men, however, to insist that combination can be employed to sell
as dearly as the market makes possible the services of human beings. What
weapons that combination may use, it leaves for future determination. But
the spirit of the older cases is missing. The metaphysical tactics which
subsumed one type of restraint under the concept of "direct" and tossed off
another as merely "indirect," the artificial distinctions drawn merely because
of the locus of the operation of the restraint, are to be abandoned. In their
place there is beginning to arise a technique that, in the light of our present
day admission that collectivity of action is essential for the realization of
labor's legitimate aims, will try to relate both labor's objectives and weapons
to the positions that they should occupy in a system that legally, if not
economically, insists that free competition in price, in quality, in service, is
still most likely to assure that wide happiness that a free people desires.
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ADDENDUM
Since the above analysis of the Apex case was written, the Supreme Court
of the United States has disposed of the appeal in United States v. Hutcheson.5r
Its decision in that case is as significant as that in the Apex case and, because
of the new approach there taken, demands re-examination of the above
propositions.
The Hutcheson case involved a jurisdictional dispute between two American
Federation of Labor unions. The carpenters, objecting to the employment
of machinists on a construction job being done under contract with the
Anheuser-Busch brewery plant in St. Louis, struck that job and also struck
a similar construction project undertaken by the same contractor for a lessee
of the brewery. The brewery and its lessee were also picketed and the
carpenters further urged members of their union and their friends to refrain
from drinking Anheuser-Busch beer. A demurrer to an indictment of the
carpenters was upheld in the district court upon the ground that the purpose of
the combination was not to restrain interstate commerce but to prevail in a
local labor controversy.56
The affirmance of this decision by the Supreme Court was to be expected.
The type of objective necessary for an indictable restraint, under the theory
of the Apex case, was absent. Moreover the pattern of action did not neces-
sarily fit within those patterns which the Court in its earlier decisions had
condemned. The tactics employed by the union were limited to the locality
where the dispute occurred,57 except for the boycott of the beer and this, as a
boycott aimed only at the purchase of a product, could justifiably be dis-
tinguished5s from a general boycott of retailers 9 or a boycott on materials
enforced by a threat to strike.6"
This line of thought underlies the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Storne
in the Hutcheson case. 61 The majority opinion, however, by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter strikes out a new line of approach. It points out that the acts
complained of would all have come within the purview of Section 20 of the
Clayton Act but for the fact that the dispute was not between an employer
559 U. S. L. WEEK 4151 (U. S. 1941), decided February 3, 1941.
66United States v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600 (E. D. iM.o. 1940).
57Cf. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 549 (1933).
58Cf. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937).
69Such as Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908).60Such as Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921),
and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup.
Ct. 522 (1927).61The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, concurred in by Chief Justice Hughes,
is mainly aimed at the technique employed by the majority. It also refuses to draw
distinctions between "secondary boycotts" of the character suggested by Mr. Justice
Stone.
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and his employees as that relationship had been interpreted by the Court in
the Duplex case. And, but for this limitation of the Duplex case, those acts
would also not have violated the Sherman Act, for Section 20 besides pro-
hibiting the issuance of injunctions against them specifically provided that
none of these acts should be "considered or held to be violations of any law
of the United States."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter then proceeds to point out that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act broadened the conception of "labor disputes" to include
controversies between an employer and workmen irrespective of whether
they might be "employees." He then finds a national policy implicit in that
Act which he believes justifies him in reading that broadened conception of
"labor disputes" back into the Clayton Act so as to extend its immunizing
provisions to disputes of this character. The result is to legalize all the
particular acts of the defendants alleged to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
The Duplex case is thus overruled both with reference to its substantive
Sherman Law doctrine and to its interpretation of Section 20 of the Clayton
Act, but the technique of Mr. Justice Frankfurter places the onus of this
overruling upon the back of the Congress and not the Court. He thereby
defends the Court from the criticism of late so frequently made that the Court
has been indulging somewhat too extensively in overruling cases decided prior
to the recent "reconstruction in the membership of the Court.162  But
justification for this interpretative technique must depend upon the correct-
ness of the national policy Mr. Justice Frankfurter draws out of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, for no objection should be voiced against the extension of
legislative policy to situations covered by the import though not the literal
text of a statute.33
It has been generally supposed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act affected only
the jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant injunctive relief in labor contro-
versies except as permitted by its provisions, or to grant any relief with
regard to the direct or indirect enforcement of anti-union contracts. It was
drawn along these lines because it went to the general jurisdiction of the
federal courts-a jurisdiction which enforces rights and duties arising under
state law as well as federal law. And, while the alteration by Congress of
substantive rights and duties under state law would be admittedly uncon-
stitutional,64 the practical impact of those rights and duties could be affected
62Frankfurter, J., concurring in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466,
487, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939).63For an admirable example of the employment of this technique, see Frankfurter, J.,
in Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 371, 59 Sup. Ct. 516 (1939).
My own plea for its more extensive use is to be found in LANDIS, STATUTES AND SOURCES
OF LAW (Harvard Legal Essays, 1934) 213.
6 4Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
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indirectly, so far as the federal courts were concerned, by the equally clear
authority to alter the jurisdiction and procedural powers of the federal courts.
Thus again and again its sponsors and its draftsmen, among whom was Mr.
Justice Frankfurter,6 then a professor at Harvard, pointed out that its concern
was purely procedural and not substantive.66
Mr. Justice Frankfurter now urges that it is fallacious "to say that that
which on the equity side of the court is allowable conduct may in a criminal
proceeding become the road to prison. It would be strange indeed that
although neither the Government nor Anheuser-Busch could have sought an
injunction against the acts here challenged, the elaborate efforts to permit such
conduct failed to prevent criminal liability punishable with imprisonment and
heavy fines." 67  Traditionally, however, equity does not normally determine
whether conduct is "allowable" or not; it determines whether under the
65The Norris-LaGuardia Act had its origins in the sub-committee to which the so-
called Steiwer bill (S. 2497) had been referred. That bill was disapproved by the sub-
committee but, being impressed that some legislation was necessary in this field, the
sub-committee invited the following men to assist it in formulating an appropriate bill:
Professor Felix Frankfurter (Harvard), Professor Herman Oliphant (Johns Hopkins),
Professor Francis B. Sayre (Harvard), Mr. Edwin E. Witte (Chief of the Wisconsin
Legislative Reference Bureau), Mr. Donald R. Richberg (attorney). See SEN. REP. No.
1060, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) Pt. 2, p. 5.
6 6The debates in Congress and the surrounding literature are explicit on this point.
Of particular interest are the two following quotations from Professor Frankfurter's
writings made while the bill was pending in the Congress:
"With due regard for the power of Congress to formulate policy and with insight into
the realities of industrial life, these provisions [of the Norris-LaGuardia Act] ought to
weather the tests of constitutionality. They do not offend any decision of the Supreme
Court. To be sure, in Truax v. Corrigan, the Court by the narrowest division, found an
attempted modification of equity jurisdiction by a state violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in that complainants' damage was in 'effect made remediless' and that they were
'denied the equal protection of the laws.' The first ground was rested upon a finding
that the Arizona statute 'withheld from the plaintiffs all remedy for the wrongs they
suffered.' No such interpretation is possible for the proposed bill, which explicitly
applies only to the authority of United States courts 'to issue any restraining order or
injunction.' All other remedies in federal courts and all remedies in state courts remain
available." FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 220.
"But in matters where passion so readily gives rise to confusion of legal issues, it may
not be superfluous to make specific answer to constitutional objections put by the
Committee in the form of three rhetorical questions....
"2. Is the denial of all adequate judicial remedies in case of an illegal strike a denial of
due process of law? This question is not pertinent, for the bill only withdraws the remedy
of injunction. Civil action for damages and criminal prosecution remain available
instruments. Illegal strikes are not made legal." Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional
Power over the Labor Injunction (1931) 31 COL. L. Rxv. 385, 408.
Two comments deserve to be made with reference to these statements. The first is that
these remarks were addressed primarily with reference to the effect of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act upon the substantive law of the states and not the substantive law of the
federal government. The second is that even though it be thought that an inconsistency
is present between these statements and those now made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
inconsistency may on occasion be a virtue, save that the statements here possess historical
significance as evidence from which Congressional "intent" is realistically deducible and
have thus unusual relevance.6 7United States v. Hutcheson, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4151, 4153 (U. S. 1941).
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circumstances its extraordinary powers shall be exercised to grant relief of
the nature requested or whether the parties shall be left to such remedies as they
possess upon the law side of the court. And the "law side" may in innumerable
cases treat as criminal that for which injunctive relief is denied. This, more-
over, was the great issue underlying the battle over government by injunction
in labor disputes, namely that procedurally injunctive relief was unfairly
administered to labor in this class of cases and that, therefore, the in-
junctive mode of relief should be curtailed and the complaining parties left
to whatever remedies, legal or criminal, might otherwise be available.68
Among these remainingremedies it would seem that, unless the Congress had
given some indication to the contrary, there would be the criminal actions or
suits for damages provided by the Sherman Act.6 9 And one searches the
records of the Congress in vain for even an inference of an intent also to do
away with these remedies.
Little help for the Justice's technique comes from an attempt to read the
Clayton and the Norris-LaGuardia Acts as integrated statutes. Indeed,
history tells a contrary story, for it was because the Clayton Act, so far as
those provisions are concerned, had become a dead letter that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was enacted. Rather than a supplement of a living growth, as
the Court now claims the latter Act to be, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was rather
a new plant to take the place of a withered and a broken reed.
70
The technique of the majority opinion is thus difficult to defend, but what
of its result? It establishes generally the principles advocated by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the Duplex case, legalizing so
far as the Sherman Act goes, certain specific conduct irrespective of the
objectives of the actors. In 1921, when the Duplex case was decided, such an
approach would obviously have been desirable for it would have removed from
the courts the duty of exercising a broad range of judgment upon issues of
social policy, for these judgments were determinative of the legality or
illegality of specific activity. This duty, as the following years proved, was
not discharged too wisely and one wonders whether any group of mortals
purporting to act in terms of law could have discharged such a responsibility
with satisfaction. For the issues in essence were political and thus demanded
6sSee FRANRFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) cc. 2 and 3.69 0ne of the great complaints by labor against the Clayton Act was that to the other
sanctions for the enforcement of the Sherman Act provisions, it added the right of private
parties to seek injunctive relief. See BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT (1930) 103.
70"The Clayton Act was the product of twenty years of voluminous agitation. It came
as clay into the hands of the federal courts, and we have attempted a portrayal of what
they made of it. The result justifies an application of a familiar bit of French cynicism:
the more things are legislatively changed, the more they remain the same judicially."
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 176.
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for their adequate resolution some mechanism which would reflect more
quickly than law the impact of events and of changing public opinion.
But with the promulgation of the doctrine of the Apex case, the situation had
changed. If its implications were broadly accepted, it distinguished between
combinations whose objectives were labor objectives and those whose objectives
were otherwise in restraint of trade-a distinction which upon substantive
grounds raises issues that parallel to a great degree those now posed by
making the question hinge upon whether a "labor dispute" is presented by the
particular case.71 The Hutcheson case has thus not changed the basic problems
raised by the Apex case but rather cast them in one area in a different formal
mould.72
That area is, moreover, a .limited one, for when means exceeding those
"legalized" under Section 20 of the Clayton Act are employed, as was true in
the Apex case, the question of legality of the combination has to be determined
by reference to the criteria announced in the Apex case. Thus the duty of
further developing the implications of Mr. Justice Stone's doctrine remains
in an area now somewhat circumscribed but still important.73 That the
development will take the line, already suggested, of reading labor unions
71This is recognized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion in the Hutcheson case
where he still defends the result of United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, 47 Sup. Ct.
169 (1926) : "So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and the illicit under . 20 are not to be distinguished by any judg-
ment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or
unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means." 9 U. S. L.
WEEK 4151, 4152 (U. S. 1941).
72 Even in this area the approach in the Hutcheson case by its emphasis upon means
raises problems of the application of doctrine not unlike those involved in O'Brien v.
United States, 290 ed. 185 (C. C. A. 6th 1924), and United States v. Norris, 255 Fed.
423 (N. D. Ill. 1918)-a doctrine for which the Chief Justice pleaded in his dissent in
the Apex case. The difficulties with this emphasis on means, on "policing" as Mr.
Justice Stone might have put it, have already been pointed out. See note 42, supra. They
inhere in the fact that sporadic "illegal means" of a few individuals may make criminal
otherwise lawful concerted activity-a danger slightly increased by the even more recent
decision of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4185, decided February 10, 1941.
73 Assistant Attorney General Arnold has again indulged in an effort to formulate the
policy of the Department of Justice toward prosecutions of labor union activity in the
light of the restrictions placed upon its earlier policies by the Apex and Hutcheson cases.
Unfortunately the only available report of the revised plan of the Department is too
indefinite to permit comment, though it seems to possess weakness similar to that of Mr.
Arnold's original plan. N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1941, p. 1. It may well be that the
Hutcheson case will provoke legislation to reverse this liberalizing but surprising interpre-
tation of Congressional legislation similar to that precipitated by the Court's decision in
Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22, 59 Sup. Ct. 694 (1939). See N. Y .Times, Feb. 14, 1941,
p. 13. Saint Georges are even now on the horizon: "If labor is given enough rope and
hangs itself without hanging the country, the possibility of eventual relief through federal
legislation should not seem too Utopian. The refreshing spectacle will then be presented
of the 'forward-looking' Court fighting the rear guard action." McLaughlin, Bottlenecks
(Union-made Included) (1941) 8 U. OF Cl. L. REv. 215, 221.
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out of the Sherman Act so far as their labor activities are concerned seems
more predictable than ever. Certain is it, that the New Freedom of 1914, so
rudely throttled by the Supreme Court in the twenties, has now been reborn
by the New Deal of the forties.
